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Abstract
In the wake of the hermeneutical turn in Continental philosophy,
the question of the interpretive agent has become a central feature
in most discussions on hermeneutics. While schools of thought
differ significantly in how they position themselves vis-à-vis the
subjectivist-objectivist axis, few would deny that the delineation
of the interpretive task must attend to the embodied character of
human cognition. Taking such a broader framework as a starting
point, I will tackle a specific aspect of this problematic by examining
Foucault’s conception of subjectivity and truth as it relates to issues
of epistemology, moral responsibility, and askēsis. As I will argue,
Foucault’s “art of living” persuasively highlights the background or
“unthought” aspects of hermeneutics. My particular approach will
be to connect Foucault’s brand of virtue epistemology with a broadly
post-Heideggerian conception of engaged agency, and in so doing
spotlight some assumptions as to what “having truth” or “arriving at
it” might mean in the context of hermeneutical practice and being.
Keywords: Michel Foucault, hermeneutics, truth, subjectivity,
parrhesia, askēsis
Introduction*
“What is philosophy if not a way of reflecting, not so much on what is true
and what is false, as on our relationship to truth?”1
“My problem is the relation of self to self and of telling the truth. . . . My
own problem has always been the question of truth, of telling the truth, the
wahr-sagen—what it is to tell the truth—and the relation between ‘telling the
truth’ and forms of reflexivity, of self upon self.”2
*My profound thanks go to Guilherme Borda whose feedback has been invaluable
for the crafting of this article.
1
Michel Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher,” in vol. 1 of Ethics, Subjectivity, and
Truth: The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New
Press, 1997), 327.
2
Idem, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977–1984,
ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, trans. A. Sheridan et al. (New York: Routledge, 1988),
32–33.
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Since its publication in 1987, Pierre Hadot’s Exercices spirituels et philosophie
antique has exerted a significant influence on discussions within Continental
philosophy and constructive theology.3 The focus point of such debates
often pertains not only to the function of philosophy, that is, to what
degree we might define it as a transformational and performative venture,
but also wide-ranging questions concerning power, truth, subjectivity, and
human flourishing. Invariably, such considerations impinge both on the
understanding of the hermeneutical task—its nature, method, goals, and
epistemic morphologies in which it trades—and the role of the hermeneutical
agent for whom, as for any human being, interpretation is an essential modality
of existence.4 With respect to the latter, reminders about the anthropological
dimension of hermeneutics seem patently redundant. Of course it is a given
that we bring ourselves into and out of the hermeneutical process; who would
claim otherwise? Nevertheless, “the myth of the mental”—the privileging of
methodological proceduralism at the expense of embodied agency—still holds
sway over many a discourse concerning hermeneutical practice.5 I believe that
such a reductionism carries a range of deleterious effects, including those
concerning the life of the Church and its mission.
In order to explore some of these issues, I will turn to Michel Foucault’s
late thought, primarily his 1980–1984 Collège de France lectures. The
discussion itself will juggle several levels of argumentation. First, I will
push back against some popular misunderstandings of Foucault as a type
of “relativist” or “postmodern subjectivist,” and instead present him as a
virtue ethicist of a particular kind. Not that I agree with all or even most
of his argumentations; much of what he says concerning human nature
I find problematic and even contradictory. What I do consider helpful
are certain fundamental gestures, certain spaces for constructive thinking
about hermeneutics, that his philosophy helpfully opens up. Besides, my
approach to Foucault in some ways approximates his strategy with respect
to Nietzsche: “I prefer to utilize the writers I like,” he notes. “The only valid
tribute to a thought such as Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, to deform it, to
3
Pierre Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, 2nd ed. (Paris: Institut
d’Études Augustiniennes, 1987); Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual
Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Malden, MA: Blackwell,
1995).
4
I am well aware that the term hermeneutics carries a range of connotations
ranging from “sound exegesis,” to a “series of epistemological problems concerning
objectivity in interpretation,” to “assuming an anti-objectivist philosophical stance,” to
“a methodology of the social sciences,” and to “an ontology of being.” On the various
meaning of hermeneutics, see Nicholas H. Smith, “Taylor and the Hermeneutic
Tradition,” in Charles Taylor, ed. Ruth Abbey (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 29–30.
5
See Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers
Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise,” Proceedings and Addresses
of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2005): 47–65. My considerations here are
indebted to Charles Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology,” in Philosophical Arguments
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1–19.

The Truthful Self: . . . in Dialogue with Michel Foucault

259

make it groan and protest. And if commentators then say that I am being
faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no importance.”6 So,
utilize Foucault we shall—albeit respectfully.
Second, I will show how his concept of “spirituality” that places “the care
of the self ” (epimeleia heautou) at the center of philosophical concerns offers
helpful conceptual tools for rethinking the intersection of subjectivity and
truth. In referring to “subjectivity and truth” I limn a semantic range that
includes some of the following: being open and attuned to truth; caring about
it; paying for access to it; becoming worthy of it; letting its impact be felt on
life; embodying it in one’s comportment to the world; and telling it freely
and courageously. By way of illustration, I will attend to Foucault’s treatment
of parrhesia (frank speech) in order to interrogate, phenomenologically and
otherwise, its relationship to virtue and human agency in general. As I will
suggest, such an intersection of epistemology and philosophical anthropology
is of enormous significance for Christian theology. Whether one speaks,
let’s say, of the pursuit of wisdom, experiences of transformation (spiritual,
cognitive, moral, etc.), or discerning “signs of the times,” questions of
subjectivity and truth are always already at play.
Third, I will stress the significance of hermeneutical agency in relation
to moral psychology and askēsis (formation, self-transcendence, etc.) when
discussing hermeneutical principles.7 Such meta-hermeneutical explorations
seek to bring to the foreground anthropological features within hermeneutical
practice; features which one can never really bracket out or leave behind, and
which account for the possibility of having any awareness of the world (and
text) at all. While my approach will be mostly meta-conceptual in its focus, I
trust that the implicit theological considerations will be more than inferential.
Foucault and the Care of the Self
In the acclaimed documentary Foucault Against Himself, the French
philosopher and sociologist Geoffroy de Lagasnerie observes that, when
considering Michel Foucault’s works in their entirety, “a question immediately
springs to mind: how can we imagine that the same person wrote all of them?
It seems incredible that in twenty-five years . . . there could be so many styles,
subjects, theses, and rhetorical forms that were so scattered, broken up, and
incoherent.”8 In view of this, can one even speak of Foucault? Is there an
author, a voice, and an oeuvre? Is there some direction, some main question(s),
some central drive to his work? What are the limits, the boundaries, the criteria
of his thinking? Ipso facto, what transpires in the act of quoting Foucault? Who
(or what) is one referring to, and for what purposes?
6
Michel Foucault, “Prison Talk,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and
Other Writings, 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 53–54.
7
For a helpful yet accessible introduction to the field of moral psychology, see
Mark Alfano, Moral Psychology: An Introduction (Malden, MA: Polity, 2016).
8
François Caillat, Foucault Against Himself, trans. David Homel (Vancouver:
Arsenal Pulp, 2015), 122.
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A prime example of such an interpretive challenge concerns the apparent
difference between the middle period of his work and the so-called “ethical
turn” in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During the middle period, we
see Foucault problematizing the notion of moral agency in the context of
modern disciplinary societies to the extent that the concept of free human
action becomes virtually unintelligible.9 On this count, even seemingly
emancipatory gestures are already co-opted, in a Matrix-like fashion, by
various mechanisms of identity formation. Foucault refers to these synergistic
mechanisms as dispositifs or apparatuses; as “heterogeneous ensemble[s]
consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions,
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral
and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid.”10
Giorgio Agamben unpacks and expands the idea of Foucauldian apparatuses
to include anything
that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept,
model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses
of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the panopticon,
schools, confession, factories, disciplines, judicial measures, and so forth
(whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the
pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture.11

It is by means of such apparatuses, argues Foucault, that the capillary forces of
power inculcate subjects into “certain modalities of life . . . getting them to do
things while believing they want them.”12
Maurice Blanchot perceptively notes how in The Archaeology of
Knowledge, as well as Foucault’s other works from the middle period, one can
find “many a formula from negative theology. Foucault invests all his talent
in describing with sublime phrases what it is he rejects: ‘It’s not . . . , nor is
it . . . , nor is it for that matter . . . ,’ so that there remained almost nothing for
him to say.”13 Other writers as well have picked on this element of epistemic
9
On this point, Gilles Deleuze notes: “What happened during the fairly long
silence following The History of Sexuality? Perhaps Foucault felt slightly uneasy about
the book: had he not trapped himself within the concept of power-relation?” (Gilles
Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1995], 94). For this reference, I am indebted to Daniela Vallega-Neu, The Bodily
Dimension in Thinking, The SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2005), 114.
10
Michel Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh,” in Power/Knowledge, 194.
11
Giorgio Agamben, What Is an Apparatus? and Other Essays, trans. David Kishik
and Stefan Pedatella, Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2009), 14.
12
Jonathan Tran, Foucault and Theology, Philosophy and Theology (New York:
T&T Clark, 2011), 23.
13
Maurice Blanchot, “Foucault as I Imagine Him,” in Foucault/Blanchot, trans.
Jeffrey Mehlman and Brian Massumi (New York: Zone, 1987), 74. For the initial
reference to this source, I am indebted to Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living:
Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault, Sather Classical Lectures 61 (Berkeley:
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austerity or immanent apophaticism concerning anything approximating
a fixed conception of human nature and purpose.14 Behind his rejection of
aspirational thought, in other words, lies a deep unease towards any type
of discursive essentializing or utopian thinking, including the language of
subjective self-realization in whatever shape or form.
And yet a marked change is afoot in his writings from about 1980 on.15
Suddenly, it seems, the brutalized self, pulped into submission through
capillary forces of control, gets a second lease on life. The image of an
autonomous agent with capacities to create heterotopian spaces of resistance
rises out of the ashes, and there, in the person of Foucault, seemingly emerges
a run-of-the-mill Enlightenment thinker hinting at a post-critical Mündigkeit
(I. Kant).16 In that regard, Foucault notes:
I do not think that a society can exist without power relations, if by that
one means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control the
conduct of others. The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them in the
utopia of completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules
of law, the management techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the
practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as
little domination as possible.17

That notwithstanding, an exclusive emphasis on volte-faces in Foucault’s
assumptions invariably misses the life-long cohesion of his concerns.18 While
strategies and approaches continually change, and with them investigative
University of California Press, 1998), 174.
14
Foucault’s reticence in that regard came on display during the famed 1971
debate with Noam Chomsky, where Foucault repeatedly refused to speculate about
the possibility of emancipated subjectivity in some future society. See Noam Chomsky
and Michel Foucault, The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature (New York:
New Press, 2006).
15
Nehamas correctly notes that, following the completion of volume one of The
History of Sexuality, Foucault “began to think about it in drastically new terms. The
next two volumes were totally different from what had been earlier announced in
subject, style, and approach” (Nehamas, The Art of Living, 175).
16
On Foucault’s relationship to the Enlightenment, see, for example, Lois McNay,
Foucault and Feminism (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), 5.
17
Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,”
in vol. 1 of Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth: The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984,
ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), 298.
18
On this point, see Timothy Rayner, “Foucault, Heidegger, and the History
of Truth,” in Foucault and Philosophy, ed. Timothy O’Leary and Christopher Falzon
(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 69–70. I am aware that Foucault’s thought is
much more complex than what I can do justice to here. In general, I agree with Hubert
Dreyfus’s contention that to properly understand Foucault we need to “triangulate him
among phenomenology, hermeneutics, and structuralism” (C. G. Prado, Searle and
Foucault on Truth [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 66). Prado, in this
connection, references Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).
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emphases and rhetorical styles, the underlying thematic subtext remains
consistent during much of his career: the fundamental problem of subjectivity
and truth, or how relations of power and truth regimes construct subjects, and
how subjects, in turn, construct themselves through modalities of resistance.19
Foucault himself indicates as much when he stresses that the goal of his lifework “has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the
foundations of such an analysis.” Instead, his primary objective “has been
to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human
beings are made subjects,”20 in the sense of the bidirectional character of
assujettissement or subjectification: the engendering of the subject through
relations of power and the (partial) reversing of these processes by means of
autonomous agency.21 In that regard, I agree with Alexander Nehamas, who
views Foucault “as a philosopher who had always been concerned with the care
of the self and whose project, despite its general applications, was essentially
individual.”22 That point is brought home further in Foucault’s coinage of the
term “subjectivation” (or sometimes translated as “subjectivization”) dating
from around 1980. In distinction to assujettissement, subjectivation refers to
the “procedure by which one obtains the constitution of a subject or, more
precisely, of a subjectivity which is, of course, only one of the given possibilities
of organization of a self-consciousness.”23 In other words, the focus here shifts
from the production of subjects in the context of power relations to the self ’s
relation to self through practices of self-constitution or ethopoetics.24 Again,
the opening of such an agential space (or the possibility of such an opening)
is embedded in Foucault’s understanding of subjectivity as that which is
19
Foucault’s conception of truth is both complex and controversial. On this count,
I side with Prado, who suggests five “uses” of truth in Foucault: criterial, constructivist,
perspectivist, experiential, and tacit-realist. On the last point, he argues that “the only
option is to try to understand how truth is wholly discursive, hence is a product of
power, but without its being so entailing a denial of objective reality” (Prado, Searle
and Foucault on Truth, 100).
20
Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics, 208.
21
On the meaning of assujettissement as “subjectification,” see Nikolas Rose,
Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999). For this reference, I am indebted to Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg,
“The Aesthetic and Ascetic Dimensions of an Ethics of Self-Fashioning: Nietzsche and
Foucault,” Parrhesia Journal 2 (2007): 55.
22
Nehamas, The Art of Living, 168.
23
Michel Foucault, “The Return of Morality,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 253.
For a helpful discussion of how the notion of subjectivation might be applied to the field
of education, see Jean-Pierre Àudureau, “Assujettissement et subjectivation: réflexions
sur l’usage de Foucault en éducation,” Revue française de pédagogie 143 (2003): 17–29.
24
On Foucault’s concept of ethopoetics, see Edward F. McGushin, Foucault’s
Askēsis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life, Topics in Historical Philosophy
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 53.
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always already underway, always already in the process of composition and
recomposition.
During his 1980–1984 Collège de France lectures in particular,
the central category through which Foucault repeatedly revisits the
truth-subjectivity dialectic is in the principle of the “care of the self ” (epimeleia
heautou). Summarizing a key focus of those presentations, he notes:
Since my project was concerned with the knowledge of the subject, I thought
that the techniques of domination were the most important, without any
exclusion of the rest. But, analyzing the experience of sexuality, I became
more and more aware that there is in all societies, I think, in all societies
whatever they are, another type of techniques: techniques which permit
individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations
on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their
own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify
themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of
purity, of supernatural power, and so on. Let’s call this kind of techniques a
techniques or technology of the self.25

In ancient philosophy, Foucault argues, the concept of self-care comes to
us through a variety of expressions: “taking care of the self,” “withdrawing into
oneself,” “remaining in the company of oneself,” “being the friend of oneself,”
etc.26 They all imply the adoption of a technē tou biou (ars vivendi, lat.) or
“art of life” via a set of “spiritual exercises” (P. Hadot). To the degree that
these various technai aid us in overcoming self-destructive passions and other
forms of existential ennui, they are vital for the art of living or “autoplasticity”
(Peter Sloterdijk’s neologism for the ascetical work on oneself ).27 Accordingly,
Epictetus, for instance, maintains that “from this time forth, the material that
I must work upon is my own mind, just as that of a carpenter is wood, and
that of a cobbler is leather.”28
25
Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in About the Beginning of the
Hermeneutics of the Self: Lectures at Dartmouth College, 1980, ed. Henri-Paul Fruchaud
and Daniele Lorenzini, trans. Graham Burchell (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2016), 25.
26
For a list of synonyms to “care of the self,” see Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics
of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–1982, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans.
Graham Burchell, Lectures at the Collège de France 9 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 12.
27
For instance, Peter Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life (Cambridge: Polity,
2013), 149.
28
Epictetus, Discourses, Fragments, Handbook, trans. Robin Hard, Oxford World’s
Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 183. Foucault notes the following
on Epictetus: “In fact, the idea of a missionary of the truth coming to give men the
ascetic example of the true life, recalling them to themselves, putting them back on
the right path, and announcing to them another catastasis of the world, this personage
is, of course, up to a point, part of the modified Socratic heritage, but you can see
that, up to a point, it also comes close to the Christian model” (Michel Foucault,
The Courage of Truth—The Government of Self and Others II: Lectures at the Collège de
France, 1983–1984, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell, Lectures at the Collège
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Foucault is not suggesting here, I should add, an uncritical buy-in of
these ancient practices of self-transformation; according to him, that would
neither be possible nor desirable. Nor is he forgetting for a moment that such
practices can all too easily turn into “strategies of coercion or domination.”29
What he finds in them, instead, is a template that, once shorn of ancient
cosmological and universalist dimensions, might enable us to concretely
approach the constitution of human identity vis-à-vis the all-pervasive effects
of disciplinary power. Such an ethics of liberation or “art of freedom,” we
could say, names a type of intentionality aiming at voluntary subjectivation
through practices of subjectivation.30 In other words, the practices of the
technē tou biou attune us to the conditions of our existence by performing
both a critical (i.e., they have a moving-away-from element) and a formative
function (i.e., the relationship of self to itself by which the subject constitutes
herself as a moral agent).31
Two things of importance emerge in the “art of living” or aesthetic
of existence so conceived. For one, we can see how Foucault defines
self-realization primarily as continual “straying afield of oneself;”32 an activity
that aims at creating spaces of freedom within ever-changing arrangements of
power relations. He writes:
The three elements of my morality are: [first] the refusal to accept what is
proposed to us as self-evident; second, the need to analyze and to know
(savoir), because we can do nothing without reflection as well as knowledge
(connaissance), this is the principle of curiosity; and third, the principle of
innovation, that is to say, not being inspired by a pre-existing program,
looking for what has not yet been thought, imagined, or known in elements
of our reflection and the way we act. So, refusal, curiosity, innovation.33

To that end, even micro-gestures such as laughter, irony, and a range of
other everyday practices can assume an emancipatory sway by which we might
fashion alternative identities in the face of oppression.34 And second, Foucault
de France 11 [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011], 316).
29
Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” 25.
30
Arnold I. Davidson, “Introduction,” in Hermeneutics of the Subject, xx. For the
term “art of freedom,” see Timothy O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics (New York:
Continuum, 2006), 170.
31
See Davidson, “Introduction,” xix.
32
Foucault asks: “After all, what would be the value of the passion for knowledge
if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or
another and to the extent possible, in the knower’s straying afield of himself?” (The
History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure, trans. R. Hurley, vol. 2 [New York: Vintage,
1990], 8).
33
Idem, “Interview with Michel Foucault (3 November 1980),” in Hermeneutics
of the Self, 127.
34
On the importance of micro-practices as a form of “tactical” resistance, see
Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984) 91–110.
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proposes a thoroughly Nietzschean recasting of authenticity by means of
self-creative expressiveness or self-stylizing. Indeed, the notion of “style” or
“stylizing” in reference to self-realization is central to Nietzsche’s idea of the
Übermensch as the ultimate self-care exemplar. Such a person sculpts or stylizes
herself as “an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain
stylistic criteria.”35 Or as Nietzsche puts it:
To “give style” to one’s character—a great and rare art! It is practiced by those
who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them
into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and
even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been
added; there a piece of the original nature has been removed—both times
through long practice and daily work at it. . . . In the end, when the work
is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed
and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad
is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!36

While a conception of anything transcending the confines of individual
creativity and autonomy is absent here, we nevertheless find in Foucault an
account of chastised self-transcendence. After all, the subject in question
is capable of assessing things, responding to them, envisioning a course of
action, establishing a set of practices, evaluating the extent and success of
her self-crafting, and even commending to others the beneficence of such
an intentionality. For Foucault, a prime example of such a self-transcending
subjectivity is the parrhesiastes—an authentic truth-agent for whom parrhesia
or frank speech comprises a way of life.
On Being a Parrhesiastes
In his discussion of the art of living, Foucault frequently highlights the tension
in ancient philosophy between epimeleia heautou and the paradigmatic
Delphic apothegm gnōthi seauton (“know yourself ”). In Plato’s Alcibiades,
for instance, “the requirement ‘know yourself ’ completely covers over and
occupies the entire space opened up by the requirement ‘take care of yourself.’
Ultimately ‘take care of yourself ” will mean: ‘know yourself.’”37 Correlatively,
Foucault employs these categories—gnōthi seauton and epimeleia heautou—as
epigrams for two types of philosophizing: “philosophy,” which places
self-knowledge at the center of its attention, and “spirituality,” which gives
primacy to the self-crafting of human agents. The increasing dominance
of the former over the latter comprises the warp and woof of Foucault’s
Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 10–11. Here I follow Thomas G. Guarino,
who interprets Nietzsche’s Übermensch as someone “who welcomes pluralism and
understands the lack of final structures. This is someone who can don many masks, live
in many cultures, the one who can renounce foundations even while accepting the risk
and historicity of human life” (Thomas G. Guarino, Vattimo and Theology, Philosophy
and Theology [New York: T&T Clark, 2009], 36).
36
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix
of Songs, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), §290, 232.
37
Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 419.
35
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lapsarian genealogy of Western philosophy.38 Central to Foucault’s narrative
is the treatment of gnōthi seauton as a shoo-in for objectivized, epistemic
proceduralism—methodological or definitional criteria for accessing truth
(hermeneutical or otherwise)—at the expense of approaches that put a
premium on the epistemic worthiness of the agent. Its primacy is on display
whenever a philosopher, or anyone else for that matter, claims to have access to
truth “through his activity of knowing, without anything else being demanded
of him and without him having to change or alter his being as subject.”39 It
is this shift that Foucault has in mind when he writes about the “Cartesian
moment” in Western intellectual history, naming the moment—any moment
actually—when “philosophy” becomes detached from “spirituality,” and with
it, unwittingly buys into an “undeveloped theory of the subject.”40 It stands
to reason, therefore, that any understanding or practice of hermeneutics
that operates on subject-less presuppositions—“subject-less” here denoting a
“forgetfulness of being” in favor of disengaged proceduralism—becomes yet
another instance of “philosophy” in Foucault’s sense of the term.
In response to such transmutations of the philosophical task, Foucault
articulates several points of critique. To begin with, we must not reduce access
to truth to “a simple act of knowledge (connaissance)” or some procedural
methodologism that sets aside the subject’s existential coordinates. Instead, an
approach is needed that recognizes that the (hermeneutical) subject “must be
changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain
point, other than himself.” To wit, the pursuit of truth and self-transcendence
are essential corollaries. Thus, we ask: What price needs “to be paid for access
to the truth”?41 How does one become worthy of it? What does letting go of
oneself in this sense mean? How does self-care produce or shape people who
are capable of “having” truth—being open and attuned to it, caring about
it, being capable of perceiving it, embodying it in one’s comportment to the
world, etc.? What is at stake here, then, is truthfulness—the task of turning
ourselves into the kind of persons (and community of persons!) who not only
desire to know the truth, but also have the courage and capacity to accept it
and be changed by it.42
38
See ibid., 461. Davidson recollects Foucault’s remark during a conversation that
“Spinoza is one of the last ancient philosophers and Leibniz one of the first modern
philosophers” (“Introduction,” xxv).
39
Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 15.
40
Ibid., 461. Rayner rightly notes that this “is precisely how Heidegger read the
history of truth. Heidegger presents a distinguished example of how to misread the
history of truth, presupposing the constancy of self-knowledge in the form of the preontological understanding of being” (Rayner, “Foucault, Heidegger,” 70). Foucault
himself states: “I have tried to reflect on all this from the side of Heidegger and starting
from Heidegger” (Hermeneutics of the Subject, 189).
41
Ibid., 15.
42
I have elsewhere explored this subject matter as it relates to Iris Murdoch’s moral
epistemology. See Ante Jerončić, “Loving the Good: Iris Murdoch’s Ethical Realism,”
Biblijski Pogledi 21 (2013): 101–114.
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At this juncture, it is hard to miss links to Nietzsche’s perspectivism, both
regarding Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault, and the way in which Foucault’s
“spirituality” might help us reread some of Nietzsche’s arguments.43 As is clear
from his (posthumously published) 1872–1873 essay, “On Truth and Lies in
an Extra-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche views both the pursuit and articulation of
truth as inseparable from the jagged topography of virtues and vices, emotions
and experiences, influences and presuppositions. There is always more to
knowing than simply knowing; inevitably, all kinds of motives, sensibilities,
tastes, and affects—all of which figure into Nietzsche’s conception of “drive”
(Instinkt)—also get thrown into the mix in a way that eludes our clear
comprehension.44 Accordingly, we must admit that
the intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, unfolds
its chief powers in simulation. . . . In man this art of simulation reaches
its peak: here deception, flattery, lying and cheating, talking behind the
back, posing, living in borrowed splendor, being masked, the disguise of
convention, acting a role before others and before oneself—in short, the
constant fluttering around the single flame of vanity is so much the rule and
the law that almost nothing is more incomprehensible than how an honest
and pure urge for truth could make its appearance among men.45

In light of such an epistemic fallibility and the pervasiveness of
self-deception in human agents, both Nietzsche and Foucault assume the
mantle of virtue epistemologists broadly construed.46 In a way that resonates
with our cultural situation in the West, they recognize that ignorance has a
personal and “political geography, prompting us to ask: Who knows not? And
why not? Where is there ignorance and why? Like knowledge or wealth or
poverty, ignorance has a face, a house, and a price: it is encouraged here and
discouraged there from ten thousand accidents (and deliberations) of social

43
In one interview, Foucault describes himself as “simply Nietzschean.” See
Michel Foucault, “The Return of Morality,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 251. The
interview itself took place on 29 May 1984. For a helpful discussion of Foucault’s
project in relationship to Nietzsche, see Hans Sluga, “‘I Am Simply Nietzschean,’” in
Foucault and Philosophy, ed. Timothy O’Leary and Christopher Falzon (Malden, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 36–59.
44
For a helpful discussion of drives in Nietzsche’s moral psychology, see Paul
Katsafanas, The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), 77–107.
45
Friedrich Nietzsche, “From ‘On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense,’” in The
Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1976), 43.
For a helpful discussion on the “discipline of veracity” and pragmatism in Nietzsche’s
“On Truth,” see Robert Brigati, “Veracity and Pragmatism in Nietzsche’s ‘On Truth
and Lies,’” Parrhesia Journal 25 (2015): 78–102.
46
On reading Foucault as a virtue epistemologist, see W. Jay Wood, “On the
Uses and Advantages of an Epistemology for Life,” in Postmodern Philosophy and
Christian Thought, ed. Merold Westphal, Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 24–26.
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fortune.”47 That is to say, ignorance does not just have a narrative, a story of
how things happen to us. It also comes with a burden of intentionality, or
better yet, moral responsibility, in that there are things we could have known
had we so desired. Of course, the deeper question of how I become a person
in whom such a desire is absent is precisely the point at which virtue ethics
and epistemology intersect.
Anyone interested in actual hermeneutical practice, where “actual”
stands in for the concern of how fallible human beings actually go about
their interpretive endeavors, will be hard-pressed to take the above stated
anthropological considerations seriously. In other words, if Nietzsche is
correct about the priming effect of human drives—priming in the sense that
drives predispose us to perceive and take in texts and situations in a certain
way—then we need to consider more carefully what is at stake in being an
authentic interpretative agent. Such a task receives additional warrant when
we take to heart insights from contemporary neuropsychology and cognitive
science. While those disciplines either question or refine Nietzsche’s account
of “drives,” his basic intuition that there is always more to knowing than
simply knowing has become a common coinage. As when Graham Ward
reminds us that
there is a mode of liminal processing, related to embodiment and affectivity,
which “thinks” more quickly and reacts more instinctively than our
conscious rational deliberation. Beneath and prior to interpretation, and
conflicts of meaning, lie sets of remembered associations and assumptions
woven tightly into the processes of how we make sense. These associations
and assumptions have been taught and arrived at; they are not innate, they
are not genetic—but they are not always articulated. These assumptions
constitute what some social anthropologists (Pierre Bourdieu, for example)
have called “habitus”—encultured dispositions, socialised mindsets and
biases.48

I believe that we gain much when we refract the Foucauldian problematic
of subjectivity and truth through such a broadened conception of human
cognition, one which seriously troubles disembodied and objectivist narrations
of hermeneutic agency.
To bring this point home from another angle, let us briefly consider
Foucault’s discussion of parrhesia (frank speech) as the true mother of
Robert Proctor and Londa L. Schiebinger, eds., Agnotology: The Making and
Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
48
Graham Ward, Unbelievable: Why We Believe and Why We Don’t (London:
Tauris, 2015). See also Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the
Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge: Belknap, 2002); Iain McGilchrist, The Master and
His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2009); James K. A. Smith, Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship
Works, Cultural Liturgies 2 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013); David Eagleman,
Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain (New York: Pantheon, 2011); and John A.
Bargh, Before You Know It: The Unconscious Reasons We Do What We Do (New York:
Touchstone, 2017).
47
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“spirituality.”49 In Fearless Speech, for instance, he delineates several
components of the parrhesiastic act.50 First, the speaker ought to present
his views without undue embellishments or rhetorical trickery. Second,
parrhesia rests on the speaker’s conviction that what he professes is true. “Such
truth-having,” furthermore, “is guaranteed by the possession of certain moral
qualities;”51 qualities both to come to know the truth and to communicate
such a knowledge to others. Third, he attests to that conviction by speaking
courageously in the face of danger. “The speaker uses his freedom and chooses
frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk
of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral
duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.”52 It is this moral quality of
courage that is a critical litmus test as to whether one is a parrhesiastes. Fourth,
parrhesia always aims at critique, either of oneself or another. Accordingly,
the parrhesiastes is a speaker who says everything he or she has in mind, who
opens himself up to other people in an entirely transparent way, free from any
prevarications, even if what he says flies in the face of the crowd and powers
that be.53 And finally, fifth, the parrhesiastes speaks the truth as someone who
puts himself under the obligation to obey it.54 He is not a theoretician of truth
in the sense, let’s say, professors of ethics are, who do not see the obligation
to live out what they teach in the classroom.55 In sum, parrhesia is a personal
commitment to “say what has to be said, what we want to say, what we think
ought to be said because it is necessary, useful, and true.”56
49
Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de
France, 1982–1983, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchill, Lectures at the Collège
de France 7 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 342. One of Foucault’s main
intents for the recovery of “spirituality” lies in the fact that he sees it as a progenitor of
philosophy as critical theory.
50
Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e),
2001), 11–20. See also idem, The Government of Self, 66–67.
51
Idem, Fearless Speech, 15.
52
Ibid., 19–20.
53
See ibid., 12.
54
For a helpful discussion of Judith Butler’s engagement with Foucault’s parrhesia,
see Anita Brady and Tony Schirato, Understanding Judith Butler, Understanding
Contemporary Culture (London: SAGE, 2011), 130–134.
55
There is a significant body of literature examining this phenomenon. As the
argument sometimes goes, it would be unfair to expect from an ethicist to have higher
moral standards just by virtue of him or her being an ethicist. See, for example, Eric
Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust, “The Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors: Relationships
among Self-Reported Behavior, Expressed Normative Attitude, and Directly Observed
Behavior,” Philosophical Psychology 27.3 (2014): 293–327.
56
Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 366. Although not the subject of our
exploration here, parrhesia so defined yields itself to a number of contemporary
applications. A quick search through citation indexes resulted in a list of following
research topics: “Teacher Political Disclosure as Parrhesia,” “Nursing as ‘Disobedient’
Practice,” “Parrhesia and Democracy,” “Quakers and Parrhesia,” “Philosophy
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As we coalesce these various strands of Foucault’s thought, what emerges
is a particular type of experiential philosophy, in other words, a “philosophy as
a way of life.” Its existential spaciousness commends a certain kind of “moral
perfectionism” (in Stanley Cavell’s and Cora Diamond’s sense of the term when
discussing Wittgenstein’s ethics of self-transformation), a moral vision that
“wishes to prevent understanding which is unaccompanied by inner change,”57
including understanding that emerges in the context of hermeneutical
engagement. By committing to such a perspective, Foucault places himself
within a tableau of thinkers who, significant differences notwithstanding,
share certain resonances when it comes to critiquing the “ontologizing of
rational procedure.”58 Any number of experiential philosophers comes to
mind in this regard: Søren Kierkegaard, Henry David Thoreau, William
James, Martin Heidegger, Iris Murdoch, (later) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Charles
Taylor, and others.59 In that sense, Foucault’s Bildung philosophy—one that
connects “truth” and “virtue” with the pursuit of human flourishing—moves
rhizomatically and intertextually into all kinds of fecund directions which,
unfortunately, cannot be explored at any length here. What does interest us
and has been our focus so far are the implications Foucault’s self-care might
have for how we are to understand the agential dimension of hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics and Truthfulness
So far in this article, I have examined two central moves in Michel Foucault’s
philosophical opus. I began with relating his ethical turn to the category of
epimeleia heautou. There I noted how Foucault samples ancient practices of
self-transformation not in order to uncritically emulate them but rather to
articulate a discursive space for situated or engaged (and thereby embodied)
with Children as an Exercise in Parrhesia,” “Practicing Parrhesia in Self-Managing
Community,” etc.
57
Stanley Cavell, “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,” in Must
We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (New York: Scribner, 1969), 72. For the initial
reference to Cavell, I am indebted to Davidson, “Introduction,” xxvi. In Cavell’s usage,
“moral perfectionism” broadly refers to efforts that stress the moral responsibility
of self-knowledge and the difficulties associated with it. Put differently, it “captures
the thought that persons are always on the trembling edge of the unexpected, on the
verge of becoming themselves through shedding what is less than perfect. . . . All this
an unending process of becoming, a forever unfinished striving” (Edward F. Mooney,
Lost Intimacy in American Thought: Recovering Personal Philosophy from Thoreau to
Cavell [New York: Continuum, 2009], 115; emphasis original). For an additional
development of this theme, see Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome:
The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Paul Carus Lectures 19 (La Salle: Open
Court, 1990).
58
Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1995), 61.
59
For a helpful comparative study, see Jörg Volbers, Selbsterkenntnis und
Lebensform: Kritische Subjektivität nach Wittgenstein und Foucault (Friedland: Bielefeld,
2009).
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agency, one that makes the experience of freedom possible within the context
of personal, historical, and disciplinary contingencies.60 I then turned to
Foucault’s delineation of parrhesia to illustrate how the relationship between
subjectivity and truth plays itself out in this quintessential political (and
communal) practice. Such an account of truth-speech, as I have highlighted,
troubles all types of epistemic reductionisms that unwittingly operate on
some form of self-neglect. By now it should be clear that this should have
an enormous significance for how we conceive of hermeneutical practice.
The interpretive agent—irrespective of whether we reference textual
interpretations more narrowly or a fundamental modality of human existence
more generally—by his or her very being determines the range of perceptual
possibilities. As we will see in the paragraphs below, such possibilities pertain
not only to getting at what a text (or a situation) says, but also to the range of
meaningful appropriations in the sense of what can be “done” by such-and-such
interpreted “truth.” In that sense, the parrhesiastes who is able to “see” and
“do” certain things because he is a certain kind of moral agent who stands in
as a type of authentic hermeneutical enactment.
But before I turn to the unpacking of these claims a bit more, let me
highlight some reservations I have with respect to Foucault’s approach. To begin
with, I side with Pierre Hadot’s objection that Foucault’s reading of ancient
philosophy mobilizes a notion of self fundamentally at odds with Hellenistic
or classical ideas of what it is that one ought to care for.61 Specifically, he faults
Foucault for superimposing a flattened and individualist sense of the self on
ancient sources, one devoid of any normativity, thus resulting in a “new form
of Dandyism, late twentieth-century style.” As the critique goes, one cannot,
for instance, simply demythologize the Stoics by setting aside the correlation
of human flourishing and a life according to physis (nature) central to their
writings. You reject the belief in the universal Logos, the moral structure of the
universe, the implied universalism of it all and, suddenly, technologies of the
self, such as the Stoic prosochē (attentiveness, vigilance), lose their intended
meaning. Therefore, yes, “all spiritual exercises are, fundamentally, a return to
the self, in which the self is liberated from the state of alienation into which
it has been plunged by worries, passions, and desire.” But at the same time,
“the ‘self ’ liberated in this way is no longer merely our egoistic, passionate
individuality: it is our moral person, open to universality and objectivity, and
participating in universal nature or thought.”62 Consequently, an entirely
different type of self-transcendence is operative in these classical writings
when compared to Foucault’s aesthetics of freedom. That this should be the
case is hardly surprising. After all, he seeks to purge philosophical thinking of
all transcendence; transcendence in the form of trans-historical normativity
60
On the notion of embodied agency, see Charles Taylor, “Embodied Agency and
Background in Heidegger,” in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles B.
Guignon, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), 317–336.
61
Hadot, Philosophy, 211.
62
Ibid., 103.
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or discourse about essences. In Foucault’s “art of living,” there isn’t, and
there can’t ever be, an erōs for perfection (pace Iris Murdoch); an erōs for a
transcendent, normative source.
I find this problematic not only because I take umbrage at Foucault’s
“immanent frame” (C. Taylor), as a Christian theologian, but also because
any account of human flourishing along Foucauldian lines necessitates at
least two components. First, Foucault’s ethopoetics is unintelligible apart from
the specification of basic human goods correlating to the kind of beings we
are—exactly the task he strenuously avoids. A parrhesiastes, for instance, utilizes
not only a variety of tools such as interpretation, communication, repetition,
and agitation, but she also does so as a person to whom, in the course of her
development, certain basic human goods have been placed, more or less, at
her disposal. She was able to acquire language, form ego identity, develop
physically, and otherwise actualize her existence, which then, in turn, enabled
her to become a parrhesiastes. That is not to say that the specification of such
goods—whether understood in terms of needs, desires, interests, goals, or
capabilities—is free from disagreements and even controversies.63 But what it
does mean is that such a conversation is to be had in order to make Foucault’s
account intelligible.64 Second, the practice of parrhesia implies a range of
capacities, such as the ability to live in a state of practical consciousness, assign
causal attributions, engage in interest formation, remember, and experience
intersubjective understanding, all of which are, to some degree, at work in any
act of self-formation.65 With that in mind, does not Foucault’s parrhesiastes
require such capacities, and couldn’t they, in principle, be discussed in some
fashion that does not amount to oppressive subjectification? And if that
indeed is possible, wouldn’t such a delineation amount to presenting a vision
of “human nature,” one that entails at least some normative features?
63
Theorists, such as John Rawls, Roy Baumeister, Hans Jonas, Kai Nielsen, Erich
Fromm, John Finnis, and others, define basic goods in different yet complementary
ways. For an excellent account of these and other proposals, see Christian Smith, To
Flourish or Destruct: A Personalist Theory of Human Goods, Motivations, Failure, and
Evil (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 160–180. Smith’s synthetic account
proposes the following groupings of basic goods: bodily survival, security, and pleasure;
knowledge of reality; identity coherence and affirmation; exercising purposive agency;
moral affirmation; social belonging and love. See ibid., 181–182. Also helpful in this
regard is William Schweiker’s classification of human goods: (1) pre-moral goods that
constitute material well-being, (2) reflexive goods that constitute personal well-being,
(3) social goods that constitute communal well-being, and (4) the intrinsic ethical
good of integrity that one generates by ordering the previous goods by respecting and
enhancing the integral relation between them. See Responsibility and Christian Ethics,
New Studies in Christian Ethics 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995);
idem, Dust that Breathes: Christian Faith and the New Humanisms (Malden, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
64
For a related critique of Foucault, see Maria Antonaccio, A Philosophy to Live By:
Engaging Iris Murdoch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 136–137.
65
See Christian Smith, What Is a Person? Rethinking Humanity, Social Life, and the
Moral Good from the Person Up (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 25–89.
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Which leads me to the qualms I have with Foucault’s aesthetics of
existence in general. By insisting that we are to see ourselves as unrestrained
artisans of self-inventing possibilities, he commits to a perpetual table-clearing;
a tabula rasa return-loop, so to speak. On such terms, we can move from one
existential location to another, from one pursuit of authentic expressiveness to
another, by the mere fiat of inventive subjectivity. That such possibilities are
at times self-canceling, that they predispose the individual to some options
but not others, that they differ in their potentiality for human flourishing,
seems to be muted in Foucault’s approach. Thus, his Dionysian celebration
of existential flux elides the brute fact that actions over time sediment into a
range of habitual orientations in individuals. Must there not be a possibility
for their critical comparison, and wouldn’t such an exercise demand recourse
to something like human nature, as pointed to above? With that in mind,
I side with Charles Taylor, who points to Foucault’s failure to provide an
“order of human life, or way we are, or human nature, that one can appeal
to in order to judge or evaluate between ways of life.”66 It commits him to
question-begging assertions about the need for autonomy and the importance
of self-realization without specifying what it is about human life that should
command or justify the recognition of such values qua values. That is why,
in the end, I find it hard to see how Foucault’s Nietzschean aesthetics of the
self, with its non-teleological self-stylizing and kaleidoscopic impermanence,
could ever “produce” a state of character required for the parrhesiastic act and
existence.
So much in terms of critique. On the positive side, I have affirmed
Foucault’s basic intuition that, for a parrhesiastes, truth is more than a
representational phenomenon—her possessing mental images mirroring
factual states or “reality.” Indeed, the parrhesiastes, or an authentic
hermeneutical agent in general, has a certain life orientation and possesses
a certain character on the basis of which she is not only equipped to know
the truth in a representational sense. She, furthermore, sees the truth as it is
for a course of action or a way of being. That is, truth for her is an existential
force that demands obedience and responsible agency. For her, metaphorical
notions of the “depth,” “height,” “width,” and “length” of truth represent
more than merely a rhetorical pull. The parrhesiastes hermeneuticizes texts
and situations, and discerns problems and possibilities in a way that leads to
the unveiling or “unconcealment” (M. Heidegger) of truth for that specific
time and context—what it means, whom it addresses, what course of action
it commends, what self-perceptions it changes, how it opens new horizons of
understanding, and how it restructures imagination and attention.67 Quite
Charles Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader,
ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 93. He additionally remarks on
how Foucault’s self-imposed strictures prevent him from accepting “the rival notion of
a deep or authentic self that arises out of the critical traditions of Hegel and, in another
way, Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty” (“Overcoming Epistemology,” 16).
67
Unfortunately, I cannot fully explore here a deeper connection between parrhesia
and Heidegger’s treatment of truth as aletheia or “unconcealment.” For an illuminating
66
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possibly, she exhibits an array of attunements, aptitudes, sensibilities, and
epistemic pliability that others with a similar repository of factual information
might not possess. If one were to give a Thoreauvian inflection to Foucault’s
account of the parrhesiastes’s relationship to truth, we could say that seeing is
“ultimately dependent on the individual’s ability to see and create, and the
world as known is thus radically dependent on character.”68
None of this is novel or even controversial. Most would grant that
hermeneutics always concerns a specific human agent with specific existential
coordinates engaging in a specific quest within a specific context and purpose
with a specific range of ingrained skills, experiences dispositions, and
biases—in short, to borrow from Pierre Bourdieu, an agent with a habitus.69
In that regard, the interpreter might be honest or dishonest, open or
intransigent, careless or attentive; she might have certain aptitudes and
competencies, but not others; certain life experiences or decisions might
have led her to the point where she cares about certain ideas or topics, but is
indifferent to others; she might have vested interests that concern her financial
well-being and status, or be impervious to them; she most certainly partakes
in specific cultural practices and inhabits a historical context that closes off
certain epistemic horizons, but opens up others; and on top (or bottom?) of
it all, traditioned linguistic practices and imaginaries shape her consciousness
and meaningful inhabitation of the world. In other words, her encounter with
the world (and text) is intensely “carnal”; she has a body which always orients
her perceptual sphere and corresponding saliences—what it is that stands out
as interesting, important, threatening, emotionally charged, and so on.70
Such a triangulation of truth, experience, and praxis as we have it in the
example above relates to the ontology of truth as found in the Scriptures. For
account of aletheia in Heidegger, see Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment:
Truth, Language, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
68
Alfred I. Tauber, Henry David Thoreau and the Moral Agency of Knowing
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 5; emphasis original.
69
See Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1990), 52–65. Much more could be said on this point,
including early Heidegger’s “hermeneutics of facticity” which structures his existential
phenomenology and speaks to the incomprehensibility of being. For an insightful
discussion of these issues, see Scott M. Campbell, The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy of
Life: Facticity, Being, and Language, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2012). Additionally, for a helpful treatment of the task and
focus of philosophical hermeneutics vis-à-vis human experience, see the following:
Nicholas Davey, Unquiet Understanding: Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics, The
SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006);
Donatella Di Cesare, Utopia of Understanding: Between Babel and Auschwitz, The
SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012).
70
My references to the role of the body are in the vein of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes (New York: Routledge, 2012).
Broadly understood, I utilize the concept of the body and its synonym “carnal” to
signify the centrality of temporality, spatiality, movement, and so on for the structuring
of perception.
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instance, Paul tells us, in Rom 1:18, ESV, about the unrighteous who “by
their unrighteousness suppress the truth,” which then resulted in a lifestyle
profoundly at odds with the will of God. In that context, one might argue,
matters of the heart—“their senseless hearts were darkened” (1:21, LEB)—
decisively trump both truth and the means of “getting at it.” No refinement of
hermeneutical procedures would have been of use in the face of such a frontal
refusal to know the truth. As Paul puts it elsewhere, “the god of this world has
blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the
gospel” (2 Cor 4:4, ESV). On the other hand, 2 Peter highlights how certain
“qualities” of mind and character—self-control, brotherly love, etc.—help
us to be effective and fruitful in the knowledge of Jesus Christ (1:8). Again,
“getting at the truth” here also encompasses something more than pure
proceduralism, especially the kind that assumes the proverbial “view from
nowhere.”71 Thus, unless we repent of our hardheartedness, we will neither
“see” nor “hear” the truth (Mark 8:17–21).
At this point, it might appear that in so arguing I have thoroughly
subjectivized the hermeneutical task, dissolving it into a morass of subjective
biases. After all, is it not the case that efforts to “overcome epistemology”
(C. Taylor) predictably come to a standstill in some anti-realist or even
nihilist territories?72 At the very least, am I not committing to a form
of noncognitivism in favor of emotivism of sorts? I would hope not. I
most certainly do not side with approaches that revel in endless chains of
signification—approaches “unfettered by anything in the nature of a correct
interpretation or an irrecusable meaning of either life or text.”73 That is, I do
not subscribe to forms of subjectivist hermeneutics that exhibit a neurotic tic
when faced with demands for clarity, attempts at interpretive adjudication,
or efforts at getting to the Sache (H. G. Gadamer) of interpretation. In that
sense, John D. Caputo’s (somewhat) critical realist adage that “interpretations
go all the way down but some interpretations are better than others” strikes
me as basically correct.74 What I do question is the way in which discussions
about hermeneutics at times assume a dwarfed or atomistic conception
of agency, one buttressed with an ambit of mechanistic and dualistic
71
Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986). He writes: “The attempt is made to view the world not from a place within it,
or from the vantage point of a special type of life and awareness, but from nowhere
in particular and no form of life in particular at all” (Mortal Questions [Cambridge:
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(subject/object) metaphors more proper to various Cartesianisms and their
forms of disengaged agency rather than the Bible.
Of course, due to space constraints, much of importance has
been left unsaid. For one, I have articulated my position on the primacy of
embodiment in too oblique a manner. Also, I wish that my indebtedness to
and engagement of Charles Taylor’s thought amounted to a bit more than an
intertextual nod, as his (post-Heideggerian) influence is palpable throughout.
Finally, I might have left a wrong impression that in stressing the themes
of askēsis, virtue, authenticity, and so on, I have unduly neglected the role
of broader cultural and historical givens—communities, social imaginaries,
social location, political context, etc.—in the shaping of hermeneutical
agency. Such was not my intention. While I do resist cliché-ridden critiques of
individuality, I understand my account to be decidedly nonindividualistic and
in tune with intersubjective and historicist sensibilities common to personalist
accounts of the human self. Such and other matters demand a careful hearing,
of course. However, in lieu of a non-achievable finality, let me close with Iris
Murdoch’s sagacious observation that accurately sums up the basic intuition
behind this article: “Truthfulness, the search for truth, for a closer connection
between thought and reality, demands and effects an exercise of virtues and a
purification of desires. The ability, for instance, to think justly about what is
evil, or to love another person unselfishly, involves a discipline of intellect and
emotion. Thought, goodness and reality are thus seen to be connected.”75 On
that point, I cannot but concur!
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